Support for Diplomacy: Peacemaking and Militarism as a Unidimensional Correlate of Social, Environmental, and Political Attitudes

Kenneth E. Vail, III
Department of Psychological Sciences
University of Missouri–Columbia

Matt Motyl
Department of Psychology
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

The Support for Diplomacy Scale (SDS) was developed to establish the unidimensional nature of peacemaking and militaristic attitudes. Across 5 studies, all 12 SDS items loaded strongly onto a single factor, with peaceful diplomacy at one pole and militarism at the other. The SDS was associated with authoritarianism (Studies 1–4) and dogmatism (Study 4), as well as measures of religious fundamentalism, immigration attitudes, universalism, and environmentalism (Study 2). In Study 3, the SDS mediated the relation between just peacemaking and measures of (a) voting intentions prior to the 2008 Presidential election, (b) militarism, and (c) resistance to moral disengagement from war. The SDS also predicted voting behavior in the 2008 Presidential election (Study 4) and mediated the relation between political orientation and foreign policy attitudes toward Iran (Study 5). Theoretical implications and statistical issues are discussed.

We will not build a peaceful world by following a negative path. It is not enough to say we must not wage war . . . we must shift the arms race into a peace

Correspondence should be addressed to Kenneth E. Vail, III, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri–Columbia, McAlester Hall, Columbia, MO 65211. E-mail: vail.kenneth@gmail.com
race. If we have a will—and determination—to mount such a peace offensive, we will unlock hitherto tightly sealed doors of hope and transform our imminent cosmic elegy into a psalm of creative fulfillment. (King, 1964, para. 34)

Over the past several years, an exciting new trend has emerged within social psychology whereby researchers have begun to express interest in the investigation of factors that promote peaceful intergroup relationships. Whereas there exists a healthy investigation and measurement of the hostile attitudes and behaviors that appear in various social interactions, comparatively little attention has been given to increasing the quantity and improving the quality of peace-oriented measurement instruments. In this respect, Christie, Tint, Wagner, and Winter (2008) lamented:

The lack of knowledge about the psychology of peace reinforces a faulty assumption that peace is precarious, unusual, short-lived, or fragile and that the true state of human affairs arises from deep-rooted urges for aggression, which sooner or later give rise to violence and war. (p. 540)

Accordingly, embedded within the enormous literature on militarism, killing, and war-making manifested in foreign and domestic policy is a burgeoning study of the promotion of political diplomacy and international peacemaking. This work attempts to contribute to the comparative understanding of militaristic and peacemaking attitudes by demonstrating them to be inherently intertwined. As the expression of peaceful attitudes (e.g., support for international diplomacy) is directly contrary to the expression of hostile, militaristic foreign policy, one cannot be militaristic and peaceful at the same time. In this vein, this article introduces evidence that militarism and peacemaking attitudes lie on a single attitudinal dimension and systematically relate to neighboring constructs. Setting the stage for this unidimensional conceptualization, however, warrants at least a brief review of some extant measures of militarism, war-making, and non-military political violence, as well as nonviolence and peaceful activism. Next, we introduce the construct of support for diplomacy as a unidimensional expression of both militaristic and peacemaking attitudes. We follow this with five studies systematically linking support for diplomacy to various related social, environmental, and political attitudes, demonstrating its divergence from social approval biases and linking it to specific domestic and foreign policy.

**WAR AND PEACE: PRIOR MEASURES**

**Militaristic Attitudes, War, and Non-Military Political Violence**

One of the earliest, most elaborate measures of militaristic attitudes was developed by Droba in 1931. More recently, however, generalized
measures of militarism have been used in numerous contexts (for reviews, see Mayton, Peters, & Owens, 1999; McCleary & Williams, 2009). Similarly, others have measured militarism through support for extreme anti-terrorism tactics (e.g., Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Bolea, Koches, & Kauffman, 2004; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006) or even via Presidential role-play scenarios in which participants respond as if they were Commander-in-Chief of the military (e.g., Myers & Bach, 1974; Rothschild, 2008). In addition, militarism has been measured with respect to specific conflicts, with instruments tending to vary considerably in length, scope, and content (e.g., Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005b; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; Longino, 1973; McFarland, 2005; Terrizzi & Drews, 2005). These instruments have no doubt facilitated useful insights into factors that contribute to the endorsement and justification of military endeavors such as war and aggressive counterterrorism.

Prior research has also investigated various factors contributing to support for violent non-military political actions. Hirschberger and Ein-dor (2006) examined attitudes toward violent resistance to the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank by assessing the perceived legitimacy of, and willingness to engage in, various forms of violent resistance. This resistance included such behaviors as physically violent confrontations with soldiers and officers and blocking traffic with burning tires. In addition, Pyszczynski et al. (2006, Study 1) investigated support for anti-American martyrdom missions among students living in Iran via a student peer evaluation paradigm. In this research, participants were asked to evaluate fake questionnaire responses ostensibly completed by “fellow students”; one condemned killing and martyrdom attacks against the United States, whereas the other claimed that the United States was an enemy of Allah and should be destroyed via martyrdom attacks.

Peace and Nonviolence

Despite a rather young literature on peacemaking strategies and policy support, several noteworthy measures of support for peace and justice may be found (see Mayton et al., 2002). Hasan and Khan (1983) developed a 29-item Gandhian Personality Scale, comprised of six factors: Machiavellianism, authenticity, cynicism, openness to experience and tolerance, tenderness, and trust in fellow humans. Johnson et al. (1998) also presented a Multidimensional Scale of Nonviolence measured along six factors: direct nonviolence, institutional nonviolence, compassion, indirect nonviolence, environmental respect, and spirituality. As Mayton et al. (2002) noted, however, validation efforts for these measures lack certain
psychometric information, such as internal consistency or external reliability and validity.

With regard to nonviolent attitudes and behaviors, the 55-item Pacifism Scale (Elliot, 1980) was developed to reflect physical and psychological nonviolence components, as well as a component of active nonviolent values and goals. A related measure, the Nonviolence Test, developed by Kool and Sen (1984), built an index of nonviolence based on the idea that nonviolent persons have more self-control, exhibit anti-punitiveness, and equal distribution of justice. The Nonviolence Test might essentially be construed as a measure of tendencies toward nonviolent conflict resolution strategies. Mayton et al. (1998; Mayton, Weedman, Sonnen, Grubb, & Hirose, 1999) also provide a Nonviolence Test designed specifically for youth samples. Their Teenage Nonviolence Test spans five factors: physical and psychological nonviolence, satyagraha and tapasya (holding to nonviolence and truth), and helping–empathy. As identified by Mayton et al. (2002), these measures all fit within the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and involve “more than just a means for conflict resolution; [they encompass] a way of life in which individuals confront problems and find peaceful resolutions” (p. 344).

WAR AND PEACE: DIPLOMACY

Certainly, the many aforementioned instruments have helped make valuable contributions to a complex understanding of the psychological processes involved in militaristic and peacemaking attitudes. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the nature of peacemaking and militarism attitudes suggest they may, in fact, be opposing poles of a single attitudinal dimension such that militarism and peacemaking can be mapped onto a single continuous, bipolar scale. Thus, we set out to test the unidimensionality of aggressive militarism and support for international diplomacy and peacemaking efforts. In doing so, we also sought to maximize applicability and research opportunity by developing a general measure that refrains from mentioning a specific conflict, enemy, or cause for peace. In this respect, a measure of one’s degree of support for diplomacy would serve as a useful vehicle for both militaristic and peaceful attitudes.

On the one hand, peacemaking is an immediate attempt to address a specific episode of conflict; on the other hand, it also entails the implementation of peace through relatively permanent alterations to the norms and social predicaments that deprive people of a nonviolent, conflict-free environment (Christie, 2006; Christie et al., 2008; Wagner, 2006). Thus, to the extent that international diplomacy involves unidimensionally contrasting peacemaking attitudes against militarism, we define support for diplomacy as the
unidimensional divergence of broad-reaching militaristic and peacemaking attitudes. A measure addressing such a construct would help bridge the literatures on militarism and peace, as well as expand research opportunities available to peace psychologists, thereby heeding Dr. King’s (1964) call that we also focus on international diplomacy and peaceful attitudes to “shift the arms race into a peace race” (para. 34).

**STUDY 1**

This study seeks to establish a politically and socially tuned Support for Diplomacy Scale (SDS). To establish the existence of the unidimensional construct of support for diplomacy, we compiled a pool of items pertaining to numerous topics and issues that focus on the juxtaposition of peacemaking and militarism. Assuming that such a unidimensional construct exists, a single factor solution was expected to emerge.

As is common practice, other theoretically related dispositional measures of social and political belief were examined in an effort to further establish construct validity. In addition to including the political orientation item again, a measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) was added based on contentions that RWA represents a broad constellation of enduring beliefs that represent motivational goals of security, social cohesion, and conformity (Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005a). Research on RWA suggests that authoritarians view the world as a dangerous place and are willing to support nearly any authority-sanctioned means (i.e., war, capital punishment, prejudice or discrimination, etc.) of protecting the ingroup from threatening outgroup members or other social deviants. With respect to the SDS and the underlying structural peacebuilding attitudes, we expected a negative relation with RWA, as authoritarianism has been repeatedly associated with generalized militaristic and violent attitudes, as well as support for the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (A. J. Benjamin, 2006; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs et al., 2005b; Heaven et al., 2006; McFarland, 2005).

We also included a brief measure of political orientation. The SDS was expected to relate to political orientation such that a liberal political orientation would correspond with the peaceful diplomacy pole of the SDS, and a conservative orientation would correspond with the militaristic pole of the SDS.

**Method**

**Participants**

Data were collected during laboratory testing sessions from a total of 115 non-traditional psychology students (64 women) at the University of
Colorado at Colorado Springs (UCCS) with a mean age of 21.83. Twenty-two participants reported Republican party affiliation, 38 reported Democratic party affiliation, 12 reported affiliation with an “other” party, and 43 were unaffiliated.

**Materials and Procedure**

Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was greeted by an experimenter and briefed on the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent, were given a materials packet, and were instructed to respond to each question in the order presented honestly and openly. Upon completion, the experimenter thanked each participant and granted extra course credit.

**The SDS.** A pool of 12 items was drafted in which items range from solely measuring peacemaking attitudes (Items 3, 5, 6, and 8), indirectly comparing nonviolence to militarism (Items 2, 4, and 7), directly contrasting peacemaking and militarism (Items 1, 9, 11, and 12), to solely measuring militarism (Item 10). The SDS measures attitudes regarding the United States engaging or not engaging in such peaceful actions as the diplomatic relief of suffering (Item 1), frequent international communication (Item 2), compliance with international agreements (Item 3), increased cultural sensitivity in troubled areas (Item 4), active diplomacy regarding terrorism (Items 5, 7, and 11), image improvement (Item 6), setting a peaceful example (Item 8), reliance on technological and economic advantages (Item 9), the acceptance or rejection of militarism (Item 10), and the preservation of peaceful goals (Item 12). Each item was then assigned an 11-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 11 (strongly agree). A single line preceded the measure, instructing participants to “Read each item and indicate your response on the scale by selecting the number that most accurately represents the way you feel.”

**RWA.** The RWA scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) assessed authoritarianism using a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree). These items included such statements as, “The ‘old fashioned ways’ and ‘old fashioned values’ still show the best way to live,” and “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining everything.”

**Political orientation.** A single-item measure asked participants to indicate their political orientation on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 6 (extremely liberal).
Results and Brief Discussion

The pool of items comprising the SDS were entered into a principal axis factor analysis to establish the internal validity of the overall scale. Principal axis factoring extracted a single-factor solution, retaining all 12 items. The SDS rendered an eigenvalue of 6.02, explaining a total of 45.79% of variance within the scale. (A complete report of item-factor loadings may also be found in Table 1.) Further, the SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, demonstrating adequate internal reliability.

Gender did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, $t(113) = −.12$, $p = .90$. Women scored virtually the same ($M = 6.66$, $SD = .98$) as men ($M = 6.64$, $SD = 1.26$). A Pearson correlation revealed that age was also unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, $r(115) = .08$, $p = .44$. Examining construct validity, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each measure of RWA and political orientation. As hypothesized, the SDS was negatively correlated with RWA, $r(115) = −.28$, $p = .01$; and positively correlated with political orientation, $r(115) = .39$, $p < .001$.

STUDY 2

In expanding the construct validity of the SDS, Study 2 explored social and political variables that similarly assess attitudes toward related norms and social predicaments operating on the structural level. First, we sought to replicate the findings of Study 1 while extending the analysis to include the power-seeking aspect of authoritarianism: social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Study 2 also examined how fundamentalist religious belief might relate to diplomacy attitudes. Previous research on religious fundamentalism (RF) has found associations with stiffer punishments when sentencing moral transgressors, prejudice against homosexuals, and sexist attitudes toward women (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, Owasu, & Duck, 1999). RF is also related to other measures of general prejudiced or discriminatory attitudes (Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004) and is associated with violent attitudes (Henderson-King et al., 2004; Nelson & Milburn, 1999). Thus, the SDS was expected to negatively relate to RF, given that fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced and militaristic.

Next, we sought to examine the relation between the SDS and attitudes that are not necessarily related to militarism or peace, but do reflect such attitudes as prejudice (i.e., attitudes toward immigrants), interpersonal connectedness (i.e., universalism), and global stewardship (i.e., climate change attitudes). As a host society, the United States has maintained an
### Instructions:
Read each item and indicate your response on the scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 11 = Strongly Agree) by circling the number that most closely represents the way you feel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Study 4</th>
<th>Study 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fewer people will suffer if the United States aggressively pursued peaceful diplomacy instead of aggressively using its military.</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Frequent communication between countries is the best way to resolve conflicts.</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The United States should follow international agreements banning torture, even if it makes collecting intelligence more difficult.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The best way for the United States to address the problem of terrorism involves increasing cultural sensitivity in troubled areas around the world (e.g., the Middle East, Africa).</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leaders of the United States should actively engage in diplomatic efforts with the leaders of states who sponsor terrorism.</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In order to improve security within the United States, the U.S. must improve its image throughout the world.</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. To address the problem of terrorism, the United States’ best choice is to use diplomacy.</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. If the U.S. wants peace, it must set a peaceful example.</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The best way for America to improve its image is to use its technological and economic advantages rather than its military might.</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. If our leaders advocate violent solutions, they can only expect more violence in return.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Diplomatically addressing the reasons that terrorists attack America is more urgent than militarily fighting them.</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. America’s strong military showing undermines its peaceful goals.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
historical ambivalence toward its immigrant populations. Oyamot, Borgida, and Fisher (2006) reported poll data indicating Americans are often narrowly divided on whether immigrants are a blessing or a curse. Using an immigrant attitudes questionnaire (IAQ), Motyl, Rothschild, Vail, Weise, and Pyszczynski (2009) further reported that hostile attitudes toward immigrants indeed extended to an association with other measures of prejudice (e.g., anti-Arab) and even violent conflict and military extremism, but that sympathetic attitudes toward immigrants were related to more peaceful outcomes. Therefore, to the extent that anti-immigrant attitudes reflect a structural propensity for hostile intergroup conflict, we expected the SDS to negatively correlate with hostile attitudes toward immigrants.

We expected a similar relation between the SDS and universalism. Prior research of such orientations have characterized universalism as the general tendency to respect and value the similarities and differences between the self and ingroup–outgroup members (Henderson-King et al., 2004). A universalist outlook has been shown to be negatively correlated with political conservatism and RWA and positively correlated with sympathetic attitudes toward immigrants; environmental conscientiousness; and, perhaps most relevant, antinuclear activism and peaceful responses to terrorist activity (Henderson-King et al., 2004; Mayton & Furnham, 1994; Motyl & Vail, 2009). Therefore, as high scores on the SDS may be interpreted as the desire to relieve foreign and domestic peoples of the burdens of violent conflict, universalism is expected to positively relate to SDS scores.

Finally, Study 2 investigated whether SDS would relate to global stewardship, such as that represented by environmentally conscientious climate change attitudes. We formed a tentative hypothesis concerning environmentalism through the knowledge that environmental conscientiousness, specifically with regard to global climate change, has been shown to be positively correlated with political liberalism and the perception of an interconnected humanity; in contrast, it is negatively related to political conservatism, RWA, and RF (Vail & Motyl, 2008a, 2008b). Thus, the SDS was expected to correlate positively with global stewardship regarding climate change.

Method

Participants

Data were collected from 231 non-traditional psychology students (40 men) at UCCS, ranging in age from 18 to 58 years ($M = 22.48$, $SD = 5.89$). When asked to report their political affiliation, 79 respondents reported being Republican, 59 Democrat, 25 “other,” and 68 “not affiliated.”
**Materials and Procedure**

Data were collected via an online survey system. Each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before proceeding to the materials section. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

**SDS.** The 12 SDS items were assigned a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).

**Authoritarianism.** The RWA scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) was again included to test for replication of the relation between the SDS and submissive authoritarianism. In addition, we included the SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) scale to measure the power-seeking aspects of authoritarianism. The SDO and RWA scales have been shown to measure distinct, yet related, constructs among many different types of people.

**RF.** The shortened version of the RF scale was used to measure fundamentalist belief (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Twelve items assessed individual levels of RF using a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree). These items included statements such as, “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must totally be followed,” and “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.”

**Immigrant attitudes.** The IAQ (Motyl et al., 2009) was used to assess individual levels of hostility toward immigrants and continued immigration. The IAQ was measured using an 11-point Likert-type scale, and included statements like, “American citizens should be allowed to use lethal force to keep illegal immigrants out of our country,” and “Legislation should be enacted that puts restrictions on all types of immigration into this country.”

**Universalism.** A measure of the perception of a common humanity (PCH; Motyl & Vail, 2009) was included as a measure of universalism. Created in the African tradition of Ubuntu, this measure indicates the perception that all people everywhere share an interconnected, uniquely human, existential predicament. Items on the PCH were measured using a 6-point Likert-type scale. Items included statements such as, “All people are linked to each other in a shared human bond,” and “When one member of a community suffers, the whole community suffers.”
Global stewardship. The Global Warming Assumption of Responsibility Scale (GWARS; Vail & Motyl, 2008a) measures the willingness to take responsibility for having helped create the problem of global warming, as well as for dealing with it. The GWARS included such statements as, “The problem of global warming will not be solved unless I take action.” Also included was a measure of support for public policies and legislation designed to combat global warming, the Global Warming Policy Scale (GWPS; Vail & Motyl, 2008b), and a measure of Global Warming Behavioral Intentions (GWBIS; Vail & Motyl, 2008b). The GWPS included such items as, “Legislation should be enacted that puts restrictions on all greenhouse gas emissions.” The GWBIS asked participants to rate their willingness to comply with 36 specific alterations to their lifestyle that would help reduce their contribution to the global warming trend. All three of these instruments were measured using a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 10 (very strongly agree).

Political orientation. A single-item measure asked participants to indicate their political orientation on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 6 (extremely liberal).

Results and Brief Discussion

To test for replication of the SDS factor structure found in Study 1, the 12 items of the SDS were entered into a principal axis factor analysis. Again, a single-factor solution was extracted, retaining all 12 items. The SDS yielded an eigenvalue of 7.06, explaining a total of 55.30% of the variance within the scale. (A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1.) Further, the SDS rendered a Cronbach’s alpha of .94, indicating satisfactory internal reliability.

Again, gender did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, $t(229) = - .40, p = .69$. Women scored virtually the same ($M = 6.74, SD = 1.56$) as men ($M = 6.85, SD = 1.73$). Notably, age was unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, $r(231) = .09, p = .19$. This is an important point in that the lack of a significant relation across a wide age range of non-traditional students helps establish validity and reliability within a more general population, outside the context of traditional university students.

To further establish construct validity, Pearson correlation validity coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each of the various other measures. Negative correlations again emerged between the SDS and both the RWA scale, $r(231) = .40, p < .001$; and the SDO scale, $r(231) = .49$,
suggesting that rigid right-wing social ideology and belief in group-based hierarchies strongly correspond to the militarism pole of the SDS. RF was also negatively related to the SDS, $r(231) = −.29$, $p < .0001$. The relation between the SDS and political orientation was also replicated, $r(231) = .42$, $p < .001$, where political liberals were more supportive of diplomacy but political conservatives were not. A complete report of zero-order inter-scale correlations may be found in Table 2.

Even after controlling for RWA, SDO, RF, and political orientation, the SDS retained a marginal negative correlation with hostile attitudes toward immigrants ($\beta = -.11$), $F(1, 225) = 2.68$, $p = .10$, and significant positive correlations with universalism ($\beta = .40$), $F(1, 225) = 30.25$, $p < .001$; the GWARS ($\beta = .56$), $F(1, 225) = 80.94$, $p < .001$; the GWPS ($\beta = .55$), $F(1, 225) = 87.29$, $p < .001$; and the GWBIS ($\beta = .46$), $F(1, 225) = 44.65$, $p < .001$. Overall, Study 2 successfully replicated evidence for the internal validity and reliability of the SDS, as well as significantly expanding evidence for validation as a meaningful construct.

**Study 3**

Studies 1 and 2 have so far demonstrated that SDS items lie along a single dimension and are related to neighboring constructs in theoretically...
predicted directions. However, the SDS has yet to be compared to existing measures of peacemaking or militarism. Study 3, therefore, sought to examine how the SDS relates to social and political attitudes more closely associated with peacemaking and militarism.

Specifically, the SDS was expected to relate to the degree to which people disengage from the moral proscriptions against killing and war. This process of moral disengagement takes place through the use of a combination of moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distortion of the consequences, dehumanization, and blaming the victims (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, & Morrison, 2002). Similarly, the SDS was expected to be related to support for extremist solutions to terrorism. As developed by Pyszczynski et al. (2006; and revised by Weise et al., 2008), the Military Might Scale (MMS) was designed to assess support for extreme solutions to terrorism via attitudes toward such radical violence as the killing of thousands of civilians in efforts to capture Osama bin Laden, preemptive military strikes, and the use of nuclear and chemical weapons. Clearly, the SDS should negatively correlate with moral disengagement toward war and with extreme anti-terrorism attitudes.

Furthermore, we found ourselves in the serendipitous position of being able to test the SDS for predictive validity against voting intentions prior to the 2008 Presidential election. With the focus of the election on the face-off between Barack Obama and John McCain, we made several key observations regarding the diplomatic attitudes of each that bear directly on peacemaking and militarism. First, McCain had been a long-time supporter of the bombing, invasion, and occupation of Iraq, and has harshly characterized the war’s critics. As concerns Iraqi peace-building, McCain has claimed that there is no alternative to the buildup of troops and fierce fighting (Gordon & Nagourney, 2007). In the months prior to the election, McCain had also renewed his hard-line views concerning Russia, saying he would be “very harsh,” looking to kick Russia out of the G8 and rapidly incorporate former Soviet states into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in what were characterized in the press as moves reminiscent of former Cold War tactics intended to politically and economically isolate the nation and provoke military confrontation (M. Benjamin, 2008; “McCain: Russia Deserves ‘Harsh Treatment’,” 2006). However, more generally, McCain had famously joked about the prospects of bombing Iran and assured crowds of supporters that if he were elected, “there will be other wars” (Edwards & Brynaert, 2007; Stein, 2008). In contrast, from the beginning of his campaign, Obama had loudly touted his record of opposition to the Iraq war
and occupation, offering a plan for reconciliation led by the United Nations and regional diplomats, as well as advancing a humanitarian initiative to provide services and safe-haven to the estimated two million displaced Iraqi refugees (“Where Obama Stands: On Iraq,” 2008). Obama repeatedly denounced war with Iran, stressing the importance of condition-free diplomatic endeavors in maintaining peace. Obama also campaigned not just for nuclear nonproliferation, but also for the aggressive dismantling and elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide (Zeleny, 2007). Indeed, Obama was associated with peace so much so that he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (which he went on to win) just days after his inauguration. Given these considerations, we suspected that greater support for peaceful diplomacy would correspond with support for Barack Obama for President, but that those who were more militaristic would tend to support McCain.

Of additional note is the Just Peacemaking Inventory (JPI; Brown et al., 2008). In contrast to political attitudes or militarism, the JPI is an interpersonal level construct tapping justice and the endorsement of virtues derived from religious principles. The JPI identifies five domains of personal interventions representative of these virtues: (a) advocating economic sustainability, (b) responsibility and forgiveness, (c) threat reduction, (d) conflict resolution, and (e) nonviolent direct action. Considering the JPI’s broad emphasis on justice and protestant virtue, we expected the JPI to be negatively related with each of the moral disengagement, extremist anti-terrorism attitudes, and voting intentions measures. However, the SDS was developed to specifically target such attitudes. Thus, we expected that the SDS would mediate the relation between the JPI and moral disengagement, extremist anti-terrorism, and voting intentions.

Finally, it remains possible that the relations found in Studies 1 and 2 were the result of social desirability biases. To the extent that support for international diplomacy has become a trendy way to garner social approval, several of the relations observed may have been inaccurately represented. Given the nature of the SDS content and its correlates so far, we suspected that social desirability response biases are not playing a significant role. Thus, this study took the opportunity to test for such a relation.

Method

Participants

Data were collected in September and October 2008, just weeks prior to the 2008 general election, at the University of Missouri–Columbia (MU) from 197 psychology students (49 men) with a mean age of 18.17 (SD = 1.37).
Materials and Procedure

Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before completing the materials packet. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

SDS. The 12 SDS items were assigned a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).

Social desirability. A revised version of the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale was used to measure the extent to which participants are distorting responses in an effort to garner social approval (Social Approval Scale [SAS]; Short Form C in Reynolds, 1982). The measure included 13 items utilizing a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree). Items consisted of statements such as, “No matter who I am talking to, I’m always a good listener,” “I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake,” and “I’m always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.”

Moral disengagement. The extent that a person will disengage from moral proscriptions against killing in a war context was measured using the resistance to moral disengagement scale (Grussendorf et al., 2002). This scale employed 10 items measured on an 11-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 11 (strongly agree). The first item statement read, “War is necessary to settle conflicts between countries.” Then, participants were asked to indicate when they might accept the use of armed forces via their responses to nine separate situations such as, “when there is not much risk for our soldiers,” and “when foreign conflicts endanger our economic security.”

Extremist anti-terrorism attitudes. The MMS (Weise et al., 2008, Study 2) was used to assess militaristic attitudes. The measure included 10 items utilizing an 11-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 11 (very strongly agree). Items consisted of statements such as, “It is entirely appropriate to engage in pre-emptive attacks on countries (e.g., Iran, Syria, North Korea, etc.) that may pose a threat to the United States in the future, even if there is no evidence they are planning to attack us right now,” and “The only chance we have to stop international terrorism is if the United States follows a strict warlike and uncompromising approach to the problem.” Various other items reference using extremist methods, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or the killing of thousands of innocent civilians to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.
2008 Presidential election voting intentions. A candidate evaluation survey was designed to assess which major party Presidential candidate participants preferred. A single-item Voting Intentions scale read, “I will probably vote for . . . ,” measured on a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (John McCain) to 10 (Barack Obama).

Just peacemaking. The JPI (Brown et al., 2008) was used to assess individual levels of political activism. Items were measured using an 11-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 11 (strongly agree), and included statements such as, “I engage in protest and collaborative actions against practices relied on by groups that violate human rights,” and “I am part of a small group of people who meet regularly to advocate for those not in our immediate community.”

RWA and RF. The same measures of RWA and RF (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) used in Studies 1 and 2 were again included in Study 3 to test for further replication of the previously observed relations.

Results and Discussion

We again tested for replication of the SDS factor structure found in Studies 1 and 2 by entering all 12 SDS items into a principal axis factor analysis. Again, the factor analysis extracted a single-factor solution retaining all 12 items. An eigenvalue of 4.48 was obtained, explaining a total of 32.01% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The SDS also rendered a Cronbach’s alpha of .84, indicating satisfactory internal reliability. Again, gender was not significantly associated with scores on the SDS—t(195) = −.35, p = .72—as women scored virtually the same (M = 6.55, SD = 1.02) as men (M = 6.49, SD = 1.24). A Pearson correlation revealed that age is also unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, r(197) = .04, p = .56. (A complete report of zero-order correlations may be found in Table 3.)

As predicted, the SDS did not significantly correlate with the SAS—r(197) = .11, p > .12—suggesting that the SDS is not being systematically biased by a desire to garner social approval. Further, controlling for social desirability, the SDS remained negatively associated with RWA (β = −.31), t(196) = −4.46, p < .001; and RF (β = −.28, t(196) = −4.01, p < .001.

---

A principle axis factor analysis failed to replicate the Just Peacemaking Inventory’s (JPI) original five-factor solution; instead, all JPI items loaded positively onto a single factor (Cronbach’s α = .84).
While controlling for SAS, RWA, and RF in the first step of statistical mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986), the JPI was positively correlated with the SDS ($\beta = .30$), $t(191) = -4.37$, $p < .001$. In the second step, the JPI was negatively related to moral disengagement ($\beta = -.14$), $t(191) = -.91$, $p = .05$; extremist anti-terrorism attitudes ($\beta = -.20$), $t(191) = -2.84$, $p < .01$; and positively related to voting intentions ($\beta = .18$), $t(191) = 2.48$, $p = .01$. In the third step (also controlling for JPI scores), the SDS was negatively related to moral disengagement ($\beta = -.54$), $t(190) = 8.84$, $p < .001$; and positively related to voting intentions ($\beta = .31$), $t(190) = 4.31$, $p < .001$. In this final step, the JPI ceased to be related to these three: all $|\beta|s < .084$ and all $|t|s(190) < 1.18$, $p > .24$; thus demonstrating the SDS completely mediated each relation—that is, the fact that those low on the JPI were more morally disengaged from war-making, more supportive of extremist anti-terrorism policy, and intended to vote for McCain was completely accounted for by their more militaristic attitudes as measured by the SDS; on the other hand, the fact that those higher on the JPI were more resistant to moral disengagement, less extremist toward anti-terrorism, and intended to vote for Obama was completely accounted for by their more peaceful attitudes according to the SDS.

STUDY 4

Whereas Study 3 found SDS scores were correlated with voting intentions prior to the 2008 Presidential election, Study 4 sought to use SDS scores
to predict self-reported voting behavior following the election. As mentioned earlier, John McCain advocated vehement militarism, whereas Barack Obama consistently proposed diplomatic solutions to the many issues raised during the campaign. Thus, we expected that those with lower SDS scores would have cast their votes for McCain, and those with higher SDS scores would have voted for Obama.

In addition, this study also looks at the relation between attitudinal extremism, as measured by the content-free Dogmatism scale (Altemeyer, 1996) and the SDS. Past research has demonstrated that extreme, dogmatic modes of thinking correspond with heightened support for war and intergroup aggression (Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Karabenick & Wilson, 1969). Thus, the SDS is expected to negatively correlate with dogmatism such that the militaristic pole of the SDS would correspond to more dogmatic thinking, but the diplomatic pole would correspond to less dogmatic, more flexible thinking. Finally, this study also sought to replicate the relation between the SDS and RWA, SDO, and RF.

Method

Participants

Data were collected in January and February 2009 from 161 non-traditional psychology students (119 women, 38 men, and 4 did not respond) ranging in age from 18 to 52 ($M = 25.35$, $SD = 6.48$) at UCCS. All participants completed the survey online and received extra credit for their participation.

Materials and Procedure

SDS. The 12 SDS items were assigned a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).

Authoritarianism. The RWA (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) scales were again included.

RF. The brief version of the RF scale was used to measure fundamentalist belief (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).

Content-free dogmatism. The 22-item Dogmatism scale (Altemeyer, 1996) was used to assess the extent to which people view their beliefs as absolutely correct independent of the content of those beliefs. This 9-point Likert-type scale, which ranged from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree), includes items such as, “The things I believe in are so
completely true, I could never doubt them,” and “People who disagree with me are just plain wrong and often evil as well.”

**Voting behavior.** As this study was conducted during the spring of 2009, participants indicated how they had actually voted (i.e., Obama, McCain, or other) in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election.

Results and Brief Discussion

The 12 SDS items were entered into a factor analysis, which again extracted a single-factor solution retaining all 12 items. An eigenvalue of 7.66 was obtained, explaining a total of 63.84% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .95, suggesting satisfactory internal reliability once again. Again, gender did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, $r(155) = -.03$, $p = .97$. Women scored virtually the same ($M = 6.60, SD = 1.65$) as men ($M = 6.61, SD = 1.97$). A Pearson correlation between SDS and age also suggests that age is unrelated to SDS scores, $r(161) = .06, p = .20$.

In further establishing the construct of support for peacemaking and diplomacy, negative correlations again emerged between the SDS and RWA, $r(161) = -.57, p < .001$; SDO, $r(161) = -.49, p < .001$; and RF, $r(161) = -.34, p < .001$. Notably, as predicted, the SDS displayed a negative correlation with the Dogmatism scale, $r(161) = -.38, p < .001$ (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>$RWA$</th>
<th>$SDO$</th>
<th>$RF$</th>
<th>$DOG$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All $ps < .001$. $RWA =$ right-wing authoritarianism; $SDO =$ social dominance orientation; $RF =$ religious fundamentalism; $DOG =$ Dogmatism Scale; $SDS =$ Support for Diplomacy Scale.
SDS scores tended to have voted for Obama, $\chi^2(1, N=126) = 3.46, p < .001$. Forty-nine of the 63 (77.8%) participants low on SDS voted for McCain, whereas 47 of the 63 (74.6%) participants high on SDS voted for Obama (see Figure 1).

**STUDY 5**

Notably, the SDS was related to political attitudes (Studies 1 and 2), social and environmental attitudes (Study 2), voting patterns (Studies 3 and 4), and moral disengagement and militarism (Study 3), yet the SDS still lacks substantial external validity regarding support for militaristic foreign policy. Thus, as the potential for violent conflict between the United States and Iran became an increasingly salient possibility in the latter half of 2008, Study 5 explored the relation between the SDS and attitudes toward very specific American foreign policy contingencies regarding Iran. Consistent with our working definition of SDS, we expected that SDS would negatively correlate with a militaristic stance regarding Iran and the prospect of war.

We also included a brief measure of political orientation. In this study, political orientation was expected to also correlate strongly with foreign
policy attitudes in that conservatives would tend to express support for more hawkish policies and liberals would tend to support more peaceful policy. In addition, however, Studies 1 and 2 confirmed that the SDS was related to political orientation such that a liberal political orientation corresponded with the peaceful diplomacy pole of the SDS and conservative political orientation corresponded with the militaristic pole of the SDS; and, because political orientation is ultimately a descriptive spectrum of labels of more specific attitudes, the SDS was expected to completely mediate the relation between political orientation and foreign policy attitudes toward Iran.

Method

Participants

Data were collected from 70 psychology students (35 women) at MU.

Materials and Procedure

Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before completing the materials packet. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

SDS. The 12 SDS items were assigned a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).

Foreign policy attitudes toward Iran. This study employed Rothschild’s (2008) role-play measure of attitudes toward making war with Iran. This instrument asks participants to “Imagine that you are Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is your job to decide when to use your national armed forces (army, navy, and air force) knowing that, as a result, some innocent civilians are likely to be killed.” Participants were instructed to use a 10-point Likert-type scale to respond to each of 11 items following the initial sentence stem, “I would support using our armed forces against Iran….” The scale ranged from 1 (definitely not) to 10 (definitely yes). The 11 items included statements such as, “If Iran blatantly disregards the international community,” and “If clear evidence indicated that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.”

Political orientation. A single-item measure of political orientation was included to further establish the mediational relation of the SDS in the militaristic attitudes associated with self-reported liberal versus conservative political ideology. The item simply asked participants to indicate their
political orientation on a 9-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (liberal) to 9 (conservative).

Results and Brief Discussion

Principal axis factoring extracted a single-factor solution, retaining all 12 items. An eigenvalue of 6.22 was obtained, explaining a total of 47.96% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, suggesting sound internal reliability. Again, gender did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, $t(68) = -1.51, p = .19$. Scores on the SDS were roughly the same for women ($M = 7.13, SD = 2.18$) and men ($M = 6.90, SD = 1.61$).

To examine the possibility that SDS mediated the relation between political orientation and foreign policy attitudes, methods prescribed by Baron and Kenny (1986) were employed. In the first step, correlation coefficients revealed that political orientation was related to foreign policy attitudes such that conservatives were more hawkish and liberals were more peaceful, $r(70) = .33, p = .006$. In the second step, political orientation was negatively related to SDS ($\beta = -.58$), $t(68) = -5.94, p < .001$, replicating Studies 1 and 2. In the final steps, foreign policy attitude scores were simultaneously regressed on the SDS and political orientation. As predicted, the SDS completely mediated the relation between political orientation and foreign policy attitudes—that is, when controlling for SDS, political orientation was no longer related to foreign policy attitudes toward Iran, ($\beta = .15$), $t(68) = 1.11, p = .27$. However, when controlling for political orientation, the SDS remained negatively correlated with hawkish foreign policy attitudes ($\beta = -30$), $t(68) = -2.17, p = .03$, such that the militarism pole of the SDS corresponded to hawkish policy support and the peaceful diplomacy pole of the SDS corresponded to support for peaceful foreign policy (see Figure 2).

FIGURE 2 The Support for Diplomacy Scale (SDS) completely mediated the relation between political orientation and foreign policy attitudes toward Iran.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Overall, this research demonstrates that militarism and peacemaking attitudes lie on a single attitudinal dimension. Principal axis factor analyses consistently revealed that items oriented toward peacemaking or militarism loaded together to form a strong, unidimensional measure capable of predicting behaviors and explaining the relations between neighboring constructs. Across five studies, item-factor loadings for each item were sufficiently strong, averaging .67, .74, .56, .78, and .68, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were also consistently strong (.91, .94, .84, .95, and .91, respectively), suggesting that the SDS is a highly reliable measure of militaristic and peaceful attitudes.

Initial construct validation was obtained by finding consistent relations such that the militaristic pole of the SDS tended to correspond with greater authoritarianism, ideological dogmatism, conservative political orientation, and RF (which have been previously shown to correlate with militaristic attitudes; e.g., Nelson & Milburn, 1999); and the peacemaking pole of the SDS tended to correspond with flexible thinking, less authoritarian ideological influence, progressive political orientation, and tempered religious belief (which have been previously shown to correlate with peaceful or nonviolent attitudes; see Mayton et al., 2002). Notably, while controlling for the aforementioned measures, the SDS was also related to constructs such as immigration attitudes, environmental conscientiousness, and the PCH in predictable ways—that is, more peaceful respondents tended to also hold a universalist view of humanity, sympathize with immigrants, and be environmentally conscientious; on the other hand, more militaristic respondents tended not to view humanity as interconnected, express hostility toward immigrants, and care little for the environment.

The remainder of the analyses were devoted to investigating the relation of SDS to variables bearing directly on militarism and peacemaking. In Study 2, the correlations between the SDS and immigration attitudes, universalism, and environmentalism remained significant while controlling for RWA, SDO, RF, and political orientation. In Study 3, the correlations between the SDS and RWA and RF measures remained after controlling for social desirability. Then, results indicated that the SDS completely explained the correlations between the JPI and the MMS, moral disengagement, and voting intentions, even while controlling for social desirability, RWA, and RF. Those scoring on the militaristic pole of the SDS tended to more readily disengage from moral proscriptions against killing in the context of war, support extremist anti-terrorism strategies (e.g., killing thousands of civilians to capture Osama bin Laden, etc.), and intended to vote for John McCain; on the other hand, more peaceful respondents tended to resist
moral disengagement from war, disagree with extremist counterterrorism strategies, and intended to vote for Barack Obama. Finally, in Study 5, the SDS was demonstrated to completely explain the correlation between political orientation and specific foreign policy attitudes toward Iran. Together, these results demonstrate the SDS is a powerful unidimensional measure of militaristic and peacemaking attitudes, capable of explaining complex relations between neighboring constructs.

Building on Study 3, the SDS was further able to strongly predict actual political behaviors several months after the 2008 general election. We expected more militaristic respondents (those scoring low on the SDS) to be the ones who actually voted for McCain, whereas more peaceful respondents (those scoring high on the SDS) to have actually voted for Obama. This was overwhelmingly the case. Yet, most important, the SDS completely mediated the negative relation between political orientation and specific foreign policy attitudes toward Iran—that is, progressives tended to oppose war with Iran due to their greater peacemaking attitudes (high SDS scores), and conservatives tended to support war with Iran due to their more militaristic attitudes (low SDS scores). In sum, the SDS demonstrates that militarism and peacemaking attitudes lie along a single attitudinal dimension, and suggests that previous measurement of militaristic attitudes might also record peacemaking attitudes, and vice versa.

As a research instrument, the SDS also boasts brevity, consisting of just 12 items. This renders it an excellent instrument for use in time-constrained research situations, as is sometimes the case with priming research or street polling. Given the prevalence of research on war-making, militarism, and political violence, the availability of the SDS as a unidimensional measure of militarism and peacemaking will hopefully spur (or at least include) research on peace and diplomacy in the various fields surrounding intergroup relationships. Further, this research has included a grand total of 774 (213 men) participants, more than adequate for development of a 12-item scale (Comrey, 1988; DeVellis, 2003; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). In addition, this research includes roughly one half laboratory data (Studies 1, 3, and 5; 372 participants) and one half online data (Studies 2 and 4; 392 participants). Further, the SDS relations with other scales (i.e., RWA, SDO, and RF) were successfully replicated across data collection methods, suggesting that the online data collection method was just as accurate a method as the closely controlled laboratory data collection method. Whereas Studies 2, 3, and 4 remain plagued by the deficit of male participants all too common among psychology student research pools, we found evidence in all five studies that gender did not affect SDS scores.
Also of note, all five studies were conducted using college students as participants. As it is, our focus was on constructing and validating the SDS among university populations because they represent a reasonable population for which to assess the basic operations of the measure and because educated persons are often those wielding more political and military power. Modest evidence for the generalizability of the SDS was obtained from Studies 1, 2 and 4, which replicated the factor structure, validity, and reliability of the SDS across large samples of non-traditional students at a commuter college, ranging broadly in age from 18 to 58 years. Nevertheless, future research could focus also on validating the SDS among non-student populations, including military servicemen and servicewomen.

All 12 items of the SDS were forward scored, leaving it vulnerable to acquiescence response sets, which could potentially inflate internal consistency and reliability. Considering this vulnerability, readers should exercise caution when interpreting each study’s reliability coefficient. In addition, access to the presented participant pools was such that test–retest reliability could not be examined. Such analysis would certainly be informative, and future research might do well to make an effort to balance the scale and explore the measure’s test–retest reliability. However, the fact that the SDS was significantly correlated with Presidential voting intentions (r = .41), and later predicted actual votes in the same direction with marked accuracy, lends evidence of the measure’s stability. Further, the SDS as currently presented explicitly measures militarism and peacemaking in a U.S. context. Whereas some researchers may find the current version of this scale useful in measuring non-American attitudes toward American diplomacy efforts, others may find this opportunity unattractive.

Overall, this research provides strong evidence that the SDS accurately measures structural, nonviolent peacebuilding attitudes. These findings may also help provide an opportunity to further the empirical study of peace psychology by establishing a theoretically grounded instrument with adequate convergent, divergent, and predictive validity. Along the way, these findings also add to the literature by showing that structural peace-building, as measured by the SDS, is related to diverse social, political, and religious constructs that may afford insight into opportunities for the promotion of peace and nonviolence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We thank Dr. Jamie Arndt and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Kenneth E. Vail, III is a graduate student at the University of Missouri–Columbia. He is expecting to complete his Masters degree in 2010 and his PhD in 2013. His research interests focus on existential factors influencing motivation but also include the application of these factors in political, religious, and health domains.

Matt Motyl is now a graduate student at the University of Virginia expecting to complete his Social Psychology PhD in 2013. His research interests focus on moralistic conflict in politics and religion.

REFERENCES

Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2005a). The motivational bases of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relations to values and...


